Publication Date: 6/1/74
    Pages: 8
    Date Entered: 2/22/84
    Title: MATERIALS PROTECTION CONTINGENCY MEASURES FOR URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM FUEL MANUFACTURING PLANTS
    June 1974
    U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
    REGULATORY GUIDE
    DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
    REGULATORY GUIDE 5.30
    MATERIALS PROTECTION CONTINGENCY MEASURES FOR URANIUM
    AND PLUTONIUM FUEL MANUFACTURING PLANTS
A. INTRODUCTION
    Sections 73.40, "Physical Protection: General Requirements at
    Fixed Sites," and 73.50, "Requirements for Physical Protection of
    Licensed Activities," of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants
    and Materials," prescribe requirements for the physical protection of
    special nuclear materials (SNM) and the plants in which they are used or
    stored. Section 70.22, "Contents of Applications," of 10 CFR Part 70,
    "Special Nuclear Material," requires, among other things, that each
    application for a license to possess certain quantities of special
    nuclear material (SNM) contain a full description of the applicant's
    program for control of and accounting for SNM which will be in his
    possession under license and a physical security plan for meeting the
    physical protection requirements of 10 CFR Part 73. Section 70.51,
    "Material Balance, Inventory, and Records Requirements," requires, among
    other things, that certain licensees establish, maintain, and follow
    written material control and accounting procedures which are sufficient
    to enable the licensee to account for the SNM in his possession under
    license. Proposed Section 70.58, "Fundamental Nuclear Material
    Controls," would require, if adopted, that each licensee who is
    authorized to possess certain quantities of SNM establish material
    balance areas or item control areas for the physical and administrative
    control of nuclear material.
    Essential to the protection of special nuclear material against
    theft are proper planning, implementation, and testing of measures
    designed to provide protection of special nuclear material even under
    emergency or other nonroutine conditions. This guide describes measures
    acceptable to the Regulatory staff for assuring continued protection of
    special nuclear material in such instances.
B. DISCUSSION
1. Scope of Materials Protection Contingency Measures
    The basic philosophy of this guide to the establishment of design
    and operational measures for the protection of SNM under nonroutine
    conditions is that, since no system is immune to malfunction, backup
    measures should be provided to maintain the level of protection afforded
    by each of the normal materials protection systems. Further, since
    emergencies or nonroutine situations may not follow anticipated
    patterns, such backup measures should provide flexibility to accommodate
    a variety of possible failure modes. For example, to provide adequate
    protection capability in the event of power failure, equipment
    malfunction, or guard incapacitation, the contingency measures should
    include, respectively, an alternative source of power, redundant
    hardware, and additional support personnel.
    Protection of the plant against industrial sabotage that could
    endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation is beyond
    the scope of this guide, although some of the measures identified herein
    may provide protection against such acts as well. In addition,
    emergencies that may pose a threat to plant security or personnel health
    and safety but not to the protection of SNM are also beyond the scope of
    this guide. Emergencies that may be caused or utilized by a thief to
    conceal the removal (either previous or concomitant) of SNM, however,
    are considered.
2. Objectives of Emergency Materials Protection Measures
    During emergencies, the effectiveness of normal security measures
    for protecting SNM may be reduced. Any emergency that requires complete
    or partial evacuation of a material access area because of health and
    safety considerations may result in a necessary relaxation of exit
    control requirements. The possibility of evacuation procedures
    deleteriously affecting the protection of SNM can be minimized by proper
    planning and posting of emergency procedures and by a program of
    instruction and drills for personnel at the facility.
    It also is possible that routine accountability measures for
    protecting SNM may be compromised by the sudden and unexpected movement,
    removal, or alteration of SNM or SNM records. Effective emergency
    measures that replace or supplement routine materials protection
    measures and are implemented in accordance with established emergency
    planning procedures can enhance the protection of materials in the
    following manner:
    a. The likelihood of theft will be reduced. Measures taken to
    limit access to SNM and to provide surveillance over an area in which an
    emergency situation exists will tend to deter an individual from
    engaging in unauthorized or illegal acts.
    b. Theft of special nuclear material can be detected. Emergency
    and postemergency measures can control and document the movement,
    removal, or alteration of SNM and the quantities involved.
    c. The amount of damage to or accidental loss of SNM may be
    reduced, thereby further improving the likelihood that a theft will be
    detected. Emergency materials protection measures for locating and
    identifying an emergency condition, transmitting emergency information
    to responsible individuals, and taking actions necessary to protect
    material can minimize the extent of damage to or accidental loss of SNM.
    d. The capability for recovering stolen material is improved.
    Emergency monitoring and postemergency assay and accountability measures
    can help to reconstruct the event, thereby aiding recovery of material.
    e. If potential nonroutine conditions are thoroughly considered
    in the initial planning and established emergency operating measures are
    followed, a facility can be operated under certain nonroutine conditions
    without jeopardizing the protection of SNM.
3. Definitions
    For the purpose of this guide, the following definitions are
    provided:
    a. NONROUTINE EVENT means any condition that alters the
    approved features of a facility, the equipment, or the method of
    operation such that the requirements for materials protection are
    threatened or are not being met. For example, a power outage, damage to
    records, equipment malfunction, guard incapacitation, or a change in
    equipment and plant structure that leads to a reduction in the
    capability to protect SNM can each represent a functional loss of part
    of the required materials protection system.
    b. EMERGENCY MEASURES are those provisions that are taken to
    protect SNM in response to a nonroutine event. In addition, emergency
    measures include nonroutine measures taken to prevent the degradation of
    conditions that could result in a reduction or loss of materials
    protection if not controlled or if left untreated. Postemergency
    measures are taken to protect and account for SNM following events
    during which its protection may have been compromised.
    c. NATURAL EVENT means a condition that results from natural
    causes such as severe weather conditions, floods, and earthquakes.
    d. NUCLEAR EVENT means a condition resulting from a nuclear
    accident such as the sudden release of radiation (as in a criticality
    incident).
    e. OPERATIONAL EVENT means a condition resulting from fire,
    equipment failure, injury to personnel, release of and contamination
    from SNM or other radioactive material following a spill or process
    malfunction, false alarm, or the functional loss of part of the
    materials protection system.
4. Emergency Materials Protection System
    An emergency materials protection system, as with any security
    system, consists of detection, communication, and response elements
    (human or automatic), which together constitute a workable system. The
    failure or any one of these elements to function constitutes a system
    failure.
    Warning of an impending or imminent emergency can be obtained from
    (1) detection measures based on sensors that automatically activate
    alarms or otherwise alert individuals that an emergency exists, (2)
    instruments that monitor normally varying conditions, and (3)
    surveillance of emergency indicators by either remote devices or direct
    observation. Such warning could include indications of severe weather
    conditions, processes that are out of control with respect to
    temperature or pressure, buildup of SNM approaching criticality limits,
    or the release of radioactive materials. Appropriate sensors may detect
    among other things, radiation, temperature changes, motion, interruption
    or alteration of an electric current, and electromagnetic changes. An
    emergency also may be detected by remote observation with the aid of
    closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitors or by direct observation by an
    individual at the scene.
    When an existing or imminent emergency condition is detected,
    individuals responsible for taking appropriate actions must be notified.
    The actions taken by security personnel, plant management, and employees
    at the time of an emergency depend on the alarms and information that
    are transmitted to them. Emergency instructions and actions usually are
    based on signal transmissions by wire or radio to visible and audible
    annunciating (warning) devices. Warnings and instructions also may be
    relayed during an emergency by direct voice communication.
    The objectives of the response or emergency actions taken by
    individuals to deal with an emergency are, in order of priority, (1) to
    protect the health and safety of the general public and of individuals
    at the plant, (2) to assure overall security and protection of
    materials, (3) to assure that all SNM is accounted for, and (4) to
    reestablish routine materials protection procedures as soon as possible.
    In protecting the safety and lives of individuals, measures taken
    to evacuate personnel, administer first aid, and protect personnel from
    radiation hazards also can help to protect SNM. The rapid deployment of
    the guard force and other emergency security personnel can assure
    continued materials protection during and following an emergency.
    Emergency actions by an emergency supervisor and by trained technical
    support personnel can assure a rapid assessment of the location,
    condition, and amount of SNM affected by the emergency, thereby aiding
    postemergency actions and the resumption of routine materials protection
    procedures.
5. Temporary Operation Under Nonroutine Conditions
    Following a natural, operational, or nuclear event that results in
    a temporary loss of part of a materials protection system, it may be
    desirable to continue operation (cleanup, production in unaffected
    areas, etc.) of the facility on a temporary basis, provided the facility
    or equipment is properly designed to accommodate emergency measures
    adequate for the protection of material during such periods. Operating
    in such a condition also might be desirable during periods of plant
    construction, alteration, or equipment changes.
    Whenever a system functions under conditions for which it was not
    designed, the possibility of component malfunction increases. In such
    cases a system failure can be averted by a fail-safe design and by
    proper action of individuals.
    Nonroutine conditions may occur as a result of modification of
    process equipment and plant design, changes in operating or maintenance
    procedures, or the temporary loss of portions of the materials
    protection system (detection, communication, or response element).
    Some nonroutine operating conditions may not be recognized as
    emergencies. However, any loss of capability to protect SNM requires
    immediate remedial measures if the materials are to be provided with
    continued protection.
    Identification of appropriate contingency measures can be aided by
    consideration of the following nonroutine conditions:
    a. Functional loss of SNM isolation measures such as access
    control devices for materials processing or storage areas or remotely
    operated process or storage handling equipment.
    b. Need for access by maintenance, installation, or
    construction personnel not authorized to have access to SNM and not
    normally permitted to work in a materials access area.
    c. Reduced capability to inspect or test for compliance with
    requirements for processing, storing, transferring, measuring, or
    protecting SNM. This could be a result, for example, of process or
    equipment changes or relocation.
    d. Compromise of keys, locks, or combinations to locks that are
    used to secure SNM or SNM accountability records.
    e. Functional loss of personnel or package searching devices
    installed at passage points in the physical barriers.
    f. Failure of remote surveillance equipment.
    g. Unavailability of dock facilities normally used for
    isolating shipments and receipts of SNM or for isolating SNM from other
    materials.
    h. Failure of the intrusion alarm protection system.
    i. Loss of offsite communication capability at the central
    alarm station.
    j. Commingling of SNM assigned to different material balance
    areas (MBAs) as a result of loss of identification or undocumented
    movement of SNM-bearing materials.
    k. Loss of automatic data processing capability for control and
    accounting of SNM:
1. Reduced vault storage capacity that may be caused, for example, by
    a spill of radioactive material.
    The materials protection measures that would apply to nonroutine
    operations are emergency substitutes for normal requirements. Operation
    under these measures are intended to proceed only during a temporary
    loss of routine protection capability.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
    Backup or special measures and actions that can be taken to help
    assure the continued protection of SNM during an emergency or threatened
    emergency are described below. For each component of the normal
    materials protection system the failure mode that may result from fire,
    explosion, criticality, or contamination (either accidental or
    deliberate) should be identified. To provide protection, the backup
    measure for each system component should be invulnerable to the event
    that caused the failure of that component.
    Emergency materials protection measures that affect activities in
    material access areas may, in some, cases, impact on necessary safety
    measures. If prescribed emergency materials protection measures (e.g.,
    evacuation to a supervised assembly area or surveillance of rescue
    vehicles) would place individuals in further jeopardy, health and safety
    considerations(1) take precedence. Further, if prescribed materials
    protection measures are less stringent than other requirements (as, for
    example, health and safety requirements or local building codes) the
    more stringent requirements should apply.
1. Detection Aids
    The following guidelines constitute measures acceptable to the
    Regulatory staff for detecting actual or potential conditions that would
    compromise routine materials protection measures.
    a. Reports from offsite severe-weather warning or
    meteorological services should be used for predicting adverse weather
    conditions that could compromise materials protection. If a natural
    event that can jeopardize the protection of SNM is predicted, all SNM in
    process, to the extent practicable, should be placed in containers,
    sealed and locked in vaults, or located in other areas that will provide
    protection from theft and from physical damage that could reduce the
    effectiveness of postemergency procedures. (See also Regulation
    Position C.5, "Postemergency Materials Accountability Measures.") b. Sensors should be installed to detect conditions of
    temperature, pressure, shock, release of radioactive materials, and
    interruption of vital services and equipment that could precipitate an
    emergency with a potential effect on the protection of SNM. (Although
    written for a different purpose, IEEE Standard 279-1971(2) contains
    useful guidance for the installation of sensors in Section 3, Items
    3-6.)----------
    (1) Other regulatory guides that deal with emergency plans to
    protect the health and safety of workers and the general public from
    accidental radioactivity releases are under development.
    (2) IEEE Standard 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for
    Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Copies may be obtained from the
    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 345 East 47th
    Street, New York, New York 10017.
    ----------
    c. In the event of failure of a sensor or other
    instrumentation, parameters that had been monitored by the failed device
    should be visually monitored by direct or remote means unless a
    redundant sensor is available to monitor the parameter.
2. Communication Measures
    The following guidelines constitute emergency measures that are
    acceptable to the Regulatory staff for transmitting warning or alert
    signals and for communicating during and after a reported emergency.
    a. Signals that indicate when and where an emergency condition
    exists should be a fail-safe, tamper-resistant design and should include
    both visible and audible annunciating devices. Transmission and
    annunciator equipment should conform to Interim Federal Specification
    W-A-00450B(GSA-FSS) dated February 16, 1973, entitled "Alarm Systems,
    Interior, Security, Components For."(3) b. Tamper-resistant annunciators should be located in at least
    two places within a material access area such that they can be seen and
    heard by supervisory and operating personnel whose actions may be needed
    to protect material or to avert an imminent emergency that could
    compromise the protection of material. Additional annunciators for all
    emergency signals should be located at the continuously manned central
    alarm station.
    c. Onsite one-way communcations consisting of a plant-wide
    public-address system and portable battery-powered megaphones should by
    available for relaying instructions to evacuating and evacuated
    personnel.
    d. At the time of an emergency, telephone usage should be
    restricted to essential messages having to do with the emergency.
    e. In addition to systems required for communication with local
    law enforcement authorities,(4) communication by telephone or radio
    should be available to notify key off-duty company personnel (to provide
    additional security, supervisory, technical support, or cleanup
    personnel, as needed to protect or account for SNM). A backup
    communication capability, e.g., designation of an offsite duty officer
    (supplied with company transportation) who would be contacted by the law
    enforcement agency, should be available for contacting key individuals
    in the event of a general telephone outage.
    f. Security plans with local law enforcement agency authorities
    should provide for periodic "check-in" procedures and should assure that
    an inability of the authorities to communicate with the continuously
    manned central alarm station will be treated by the authorities as a
    call for assistance. Contacts or liaison with local law enforcement
    authorities should include utilization of intelligence-gathering groups
    for possible warning or to aid in the recovery of stolen material.
    ----------
    (3) Copies may be obtained from the Standardization Division,
    Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration, Washington,
    D.C. 20406.
    (4) Paragraph 73.50(e)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73.
    ----------
3. Personnel Control
    The following guidelines constitute emergency measures that are
    acceptable to the Regulatory staff for controlling access to SNM during
    or following an emergency.
    a. Evacuation
    (1) All personnel should be instructed and drilled in the
    salient features of the emergency materials protection plan. Since the
    plan may be quite complex and repetitive, an abstract, memo, manual, or
    list of rules should be published and distributed to all employees and
    visitors. In addition, key instructions for individual areas within the
    plant should be posted in conspicuous locations.
    (2) If consistent with personnel health and safety
    considerations, emergency rendezvous areas should be located within the
    protected area.
    (3) Personnel who are evacuated from a facility because of
    an emergency should leave according to established plans and routes with
    a minimum of travel through material access areas. Emergency exit
    routes from a material access area should avoid passage through other
    material access areas.
    (4) Personnel evacuated from or through a material access
    area should be under surveillance wherever possible as they are being
    evacuated, and should be kept under surveillance after they are
    evacuated, and should rendezvous at a single predetermined location
    until dismissed or instructed to return to work. Such personnel should
    be identified from area access control records and accounted for.(5) (5) Emergency exists from the protected area should be
    designed to allow continuous visual surveillance of evacuating personnel
    during evacuation.
    (6) Areas where individuals assemble following an
    evacuation should be clear of obstructions that would provide
    concealment such as buildings, fences, trees, or shrubbery and should be
    restricted from public access.
    (7) All persons and vehicles leaving a protected area or
    emergency rendezvous area should be assumed to bear concealed SNM and
    should be accompanied by supervisory or security personnel until
    circumstances allow a search to be conducted.(5) Personnel requiring
    offsite medical attention should not be exempted.
    (8) If an emergency situation cannot be controlled
    adequately with the available onsite manpower, additional off-duty
    company personnel should be called in or support should be obtained from
    offsite local, State, or Federal agencies. Offsite organizations may
    include local law enforcement authorities, fire departments, AEC
    personnel, State health departments, hospitals, and ambulance and rescue
    services.
    ----------
    (5) See also Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of Personnel Access to
    Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas."
    ----------
    b. Emergency Access Control
    (1) Records of persons granted access to material access
    areas prior to, during, and after an emergency should be secured and
    maintained for later analysis.
    (2) Measures should be taken to protect or provide backup
    for required intrusion detectors(6) so that all exits from and entrances
    to an evacuated material access area can be closed, locked, and alarmed.
    If not alarmed, such areas should be kept under continuous direct or
    remote visual surveillance.
    (3) Construction materials should be available on site for
    making emergency repairs to breaks in the physical barriers.
    (4) Access to evacuated material access areas should be
    restricted to authorize security, supervisory, emergency materials
    protection, and rescue personnel in accordance with established
    emergency procedures.
    (5) Emergency keys or lock combinations necessary for
    emergency personnel should be stored in tamper-resistant, alarmed
    enclosures and should be changed whenever there is reason to believe
    such an enclosure may have been compromised. (Disadvantages of master
    keyed locks is discussed in another regulatory guide.(7)) c. Surveillance
    (1) Emergency lighting from an alternative or secondary
    power source should be provided to all material access areas to provide
    illumination sufficient for surveillance(8) during periods when the
    normal lighting system is inoperative. If an area-wide power failure
    would disrupt the secondary power supply, battery-powered floodlights
    designed to activate automatically if the normal lighting system fails
    should be installed throughout the material access area in a manner that
    provides general illumination of not less than 0.2 foot-candle.(9) In
    addition, all security personnel should be provided with portable
    battery-powered spotlights. All battery-powered lights should be
    provided with a signal light to warn of weak batteries.
    (2) Planning should include, as appropriate, the use of
    portable CCTV equipment to survey and to monitor activites in a material
    access area following an emergency in which sensors or other monitoring
    equipment have become inoperative and conditions exist that make
    extended occupancy hazardous.
    ----------
    (6) Paragraph 73.60(c) of 10 CFR Part 73.
    (7) Regulatory Guide 5.12, "General Use of Locks in the Protection
    and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materias."
    (8) Regulatory Guide 5.14, "Visual Surveillance of Individuals in
    Material Access Areas."
    (9) Local safety codes may require higher levels of illumination
    to assure safe evacuation.
    ----------
    (3) Additional security or guard personnel should be
    called in or other qualified plant personnel should be designated to
    support the regular security personnel as needed for performing backup
    guard functions, surveillance, and materials protection for a material
    access area that is threatened or affected by an emergency.
    (4) All emergency vehicles (company-owned or owned by an
    offsite organization) that are brought into a protected area and are
    used for the transfer of equipment or personnel to or from a material
    access area during or following an emergency should be under continuous
    surveillance by supervisory or security personnel while within the
    protected area. If surveillance has not been continuous, exiting
    vehicles and any individuals therein should be accompanied until both
    can be searched for concealed SNM.
4. Nonroutine Operation
    The following guidelines constitute measures that are acceptable
    to the Regulatory staff for assuring continued protection of SNM while a
    plant or process is temporarily operating under nonroutine conditions
    which could otherwise reduce the protection afforded by routine
    materials protection measures.
    a. Necessary Nonroutine Operation
    While certain nonroutine operations may be desirable
    (particularly cleanup after a natural or nuclear emergency), extensive
    use of emergency measures cannot justify long-term operation in
    noncompliance with AEC rules, regulations, license conditions, or
    order.(10) (1) The design of automated or remotely operated equipment
    for processing, transporting, or storing SNM should provide for access
    to equipment, as allowed by safety considerations, to facilitate removal
    or draindown of SNM. Manual operations or maintenance to equipment that
    may permit access to SNM should be performed within controlled material
    access areas by individuals authorized to have access to SNM.
    (2) Material access areas should be designed with
    sufficient clearance to permit the installation of temporary physical
    barriers to isolate areas that might require postemergency cleanup or
    other nonroutine activities by personnel who are not authorized access
    to SNM. If deductive surveillance(11) is to be utilized for activities
    in such "isolated" areas, the area should be separated from other areas
    by barriers equivalent to those normally required for material access
    areas.(12) (3) Where possible, SNM should be removed from process
    equipment and accounted for before any nonroutine activities are
    undertaken in that area. All hardware and tools removed from a material
    access area should be examined for SNM, and all personnel should be
    searched for concealed SNM.(13)----------
    (10) Paragraphs 70.32(c) and 70.32(e) of 10 CFR Part 70.
    (11) See Regulatory Guide 5.14, "Visual Surveillance of
    Individuals in Material Access Areas."
    (12) Paragraph 73.2(f) of 10 CFR Part 73. (Standards for Barrier
    Construction are the subject of a regulatory guide under development.)
    ----------
    (4) To provide for temporary handling of both shipments
    and receipts of SNM in the same dock area, physical separation should be
    provided between the dock platforms and material storage areas at the
    dock. Storage areas should be designed with clear space sufficient to
    accommodate operations normally done on the dock e.g., removal of outer
    packaging, gross measurement check, seal verification, etc.
    (5) Process equipment in which in situ measurements or in
    situ calibration of instruments is normally performed should be designed
    with provisions for emergency access and working space to utilize
    alternative or duplicate sampling, measuring, and calibrating equipment
    or devices.
    b. Protection System Component Failure
    Continuous direct visual surveillance by security or
    supervisory personnel or other backup measures should be provided for
    all materials security devices, the operability or required level of
    performance of which cannot be verified.
    (1) Whenever changes in process operations, equipment
    design, or equipment location can reduce normal inspection and testing
    capability, special design features and operating procedures implemented
    must be consistent with approved license amendments.(14) To aid
    implementation and approval, duplicate or equivalent backup measuring
    and testing devices may be provided. Also, use of calibrated
    nondestructive assay equipment, or procedures which call for a partial
    shutdown for sampling, special calibration of instruments, or obtaining
    physical measurements, may be substituted for normal in-line or dynamic
    inventory measurements. Equipment also may be designed with
    supplemental viewing and inspection ports or openings that can take the
    place of primary access ports blocked owing to changes in equipment
    design or location.
    (2) Provisions for manual searches or backup monitoring
    equipment should be available in the event of temporary malfunction of
    equipment routinely used to search individuals, packages, and vehicles
    exiting from material access areas. Equipment normally in use at two
    different control points may serve as backup for one another, provided
    either control point can be deactivated (blocked, locked, and alarmed)
    when not properly equipped.
    (3) Backup equipment should be available for monitoring
    all waste streams for SNM. When not in use, this equipment should be
    stored in an area physically separated from primary monitoring
    equipment.
    (4) Backup capability for surveillance of material
    processing or storage areas should be provided in the event of failure
    of an intrusion alarm or remote visual surveillance system. This backup
    may be a redundant intrusion alarm system and/or a capability for
    continuous on-location visual surveillance by security or supervisory
    personnel who can communicate with the continuously manned central alarm
    station.
    ----------
    (13) Paragraph 73.60(b) of 10 CFR Part 73.
    (14) Paragraph 70.32(b) of 10 CFR Part 70.
    ----------
    (5) Security, supervisory, or authorized operating
    personnel such as storage or vault custodians should provide continuous
    direct surveillance of any normally locked or secured process or storage
    area for periods when keys are lost or unaccounted for, locks are
    damaged, or lock combinations are compromised. This surveillance should
    be continued until all affected locks are replaced or until lock
    combinations are changed by authorized security or management
    personnel.(7)5. Postemergency Materials Accountability Measures
    The following guidelines constitute actions that are acceptable to
    the Regulatory staff for assuring continued materials control and
    accounting following an emergency.
    a. Accounting
    (1) Emergency measures should assure the integrity of
    material accountability records so that a valid postemergency material
    balance can be made following conditions in which the identification of
    SNM items may have been lost or obliterated, SNM may have been relocated
    to another material balance area (MBA) without adequate transfer
    records, or equipment that may have contained SNM has been removed.
    When SNM has been relocated to another area, a temporary MBA
    should be established that encompasses both the original area and the
    new area. This temporary MBA should be physically identified with
    suitable markings or barriers. All SNM within the temporary MBA should
    be physically inventoried and new records obtained and reconciled with
    the preemergency records. Measurements should be of sufficient quality
    that the uncertainty of the postemergency inventory is no greater than
    the uncertainty of the preemrrgency records. New separate MBAs with
    material transfer stations, custodians, and records may be necessary for
    SNM (or equipment containing SNM) that is relocated for postemergency
    cleanup or recovery.
    (2) If electronic data processing is used for SNM control
    and accounting, a master file should be maintained which can be updated
    from a log of transactions processed subsequent to the last updating of
    the file. A capability for the manual recording of data normally
    entered automatically may also be desirable.(15) (3) As soon as possible after an emergency all SNM control
    records should be accounted for and placed in locked storage or kept
    under continuous direct or remote surveillance until needed for
    inventory and SNM accountability.
    ----------
    (15) Regulatory guides dealing with material control and
    accounting records are under development.
    ----------
    b. Control and Documentation
    (1) Emergency exits should be designed so that they may be
    used temporarily to replace normal access or exit control points.
    Inoperative access points should be barricaded or locked and, in either
    case, they should be alarmed consistently with requirements for material
    access areas.(16) Direct visual surveillance should be maintained over
    any unalarmed, though inoperative or unused, access points (emergency as
    well as normal access points).
    (2) Solid, liquid, and gaseous effluents from a material
    access area normally must be monitored to detect and measure SNM that
    may be released.(17) Retention ponds and tanks should be provided as
    necessary to allow monitoring of liquid effluents from emergency-related
    activities such as fire fighting and decontamination.
    (3) The location of all SNM in a facility should be
    determined as soon as possible after an emergency to assure continued
    surveillance and access control of such material. Temporary material
    access areas or boundaries should be established in the event that SNM
    must be moved or barriers removed during or as a result of an emergency.
    (4) Nondestructive assay equipment should be available to
    assist in timely verification of SNM content of materials that may have
    been spilled, moved, or altered during an emergency.
    (5) If SNM that is not in process cannot be protected
    because of temporary loss of normal vault or storage capability,
    emergency measures should be taken to assure that security and
    accountability requirements are met. Temporary storage areas should be
    designated and should be physically separated from process or other
    material access areas with a temporary isolation barrier that can be
    kept under continuous direct surveillance by security personnel or by an
    authorized vault custodian. If other areas approved for SNM storage are
    available, material should be relocated to these areas and afforded the
    full protection routinely required of SNM (access control, intrusion
    alarms, surveillance, etc.). While SNM is being relocated to temporary
    storage, sealed containers should not be opened unless there is reason
    to suspect that seals have been compromised. Unsealed containers of SNM
    should be identified, sealed, and listed before being relocated. All
    relocated containers should be locked(7) (either individually or in a
    larger container with others) to physically isolate them from
    individuals who are authorized to have access to materials normally
    assigned to the temporary storage area. Similarly, SNM normally assigned
    to the area should be locked or otherwise protected from individuals who
    are authorized to have access to the relocated material. When normal
    vault or other storage capability has been restored and the material is
    returned from temporary storage, the integrity of each seal should be
    verified.(18)----------
    (16) Paragraph 73.60(c) of 10 CFR Part 73.
    (17) Paragraph 70.22(b)(1) of 10 CFR Part 70.
    ----------
    (6) In the event the relocated SNM has not been
    continuously isolated while in temporary storage or if there is reason
    to suspect that a seal has been compromised, all suspect and unsealed
    packages at that storage location, whether believed to contain SNM or
    not, should be opened if necessary and the contents remeasured to verify
    that no SNM has been stolen or illicitly transferred to another
    container to aid later removal.
    ----------
    (18) Regualtory Guide 5.15, "Security Seals for the Protection and
    Control of Special Nuclear Material."
    ----------
    (7) All measures taken to protect SNM during an emergency,
    whether in accordance with established emergency plans or a departure
    from such plans, should be documented. This should include, where
    feasible, a record of instructions given and actions taken and should
    include interviews with individuals who were in the material access area
    immediately prior to the emergency. These records should be reviewed
    for post-accident or postemergency analysis of possible deliberate cause
    and for modifying emergency procedures as appropriate.
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